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Abstract
This study focuses on the negative effects of the highly competitive academic environment. We summarized the
literature on what consequences an over-competitive system has on the people involved and on the productivity
of the system as a whole. We conclude that negative effects outweigh the potential gains which competitive sys-
tems bring about. The literature suggests that not only do constant rejections demotivate the majority of academ-
ics, but also the funding allocation process in itself seems inefficient. The pressure on academics is so high that we
tend to systematically over-estimate our success chances of our funding proposals, manuscripts and promotion
requests.
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Introduction
Competition is a constant condition in modern society.We compete not only in sports, but also for better jobs,
influence, and status. Companies compete with their prod-
ucts, and politicians compete for votes. The assumption is
that through competition, people, in general, work harder
and that the better person, or product, can be identified and
rewarded accordingly.
The value of competition in socioeconomic mechanisms has
been largely unquestioned since the development of modern
neoliberalism in the 1980s, based on the economic and philo-
sophical writings of Hayek and Friedman (e.g., Refs.1,2). The
philosophy of neoliberalism led to a range of legislative re-
forms reducing government control of the economy, including
support for free trade, privatization, and deregulation.
In Australia, this neoliberal agenda found its way into
higher education in 1987 through reforms initiated by the
Labor Education Minister John Dawkins, with a shift toward
nonpublic funding and a market orientation in the tertiary
sector.3 The election of the conservative Howard government
in 1996 continued this sector reform, continuing the real fund-
ing cuts initiated by the previous government, refocusing the
purpose of universities, and changing management practices.
A similar path was followed in New Zealand.4,5
‘‘Tertiary education institutions would, neoliberals believed, be bet-
ter served by a ‘Board of Directors’ style of governance, with full
competition between public and private institutions, lower govern-
ment subsidies, and stronger (managerialist) accountability mecha-
nisms. The model of the market, in New Zealand as elsewhere,
provided the basis for the whole organization of society: the ideal
was one in which different individuals would strive for advantage
over others in an environment of largely unfettered competition,
with minimal state interference and a heavy emphasis on ‘the bottom
line’ in all policy and decision-making processes’’.5
Academia is clearly no exception to this new emphasis on
competition. The often-declared state of ‘‘publish-or-perish’’
hints at what pressure academics are exposed to. It does ap-
pear, however, that the process and goal of the competition
in academia is more ambiguous than in other fields of
human endeavor. It often reminds us of the Caucus-Race as
described in Alice In Wonderland6:
There was no ‘‘one, two, three, and away!’’ but they began running
when they liked and left when they liked, so it was not easy to know
when the race was over. However, when they had been running half
an hour or so, and were quite dry again, the dodo suddenly called out
‘‘the race is over!’’ and they all crowded round it panting, and ask-
ing, ‘‘but who has won?’’
Not only can the academic environment be confusing as to
how and why people compete, but also many participants are
also under the impression that the often-ignored negative
side effects counterbalance the positive effects which compe-
tition might bring about. At a point where the negative effects
completely outweigh the positive effects, competition turns
sour and the system is in a state of over-competiveness.
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This article presents a literature overview of over-compet-
itiveness in an attempt to gain a better insight into the under-
lying processes and its consequences. We focus on the
potentially most significant factors that may be related to
over-competitiveness. More specifically, we intend to high-
light the negative effects of competition. These factors are
often neglected, as we prefer to think about ourselves as win-
ners and need to maintain an aura of success.7 Furthermore, it
is always dangerous to question the rules of the game while
playing it. We structured the factors roughly by how a stereo-
typical academic, let us call him Brian S. Smith, would make
his way though the academic world, starting as a student and
ending as a Professor Smith.
Becoming an Academic
Competition in academia for recognition and advancement
is common. For a new academic, it begins at the graduate
study level with competition to get into a good university,
where a student will develop his or her knowledge, skills,
and competencies. It is also in this environment that, by os-
mosis, Brian S. Smith and other academics develop attitudes
and values which will serve them in their academic profes-
sion.8 On reaching the post-graduate level, Brian S. Smith
will seek out a supervisor who will act as a mentor and role
model by encouraging him in his own publications, starting
him off well in his own career.8 In that career, academics
will then engage in continual competition until they are
employed in a prestigious institution with a high caliber of
doctoral training, colleagueship, and access to resources.
In the competitive environment of scientifically advanced
countries, academics are encouraged to compete against
one another to become specialists in their field, and they con-
centrate all of their efforts toward gaining promotion and in-
creasing salaries.5 In a paper analyzing the outcome of a
reform of the academic career structure in Norway, Olsen
et al. (2005)9 compared the common competition model
with the competence model adopted in which associate pro-
fessors can apply for a promotion to full professorships on
the basis of individual research competence, irrespective of
vacant professorships. The competition model in comparison
is a conventional promotional system in which those seeking
promotion compete with other applicants to fill a vacant po-
sition.9 In the United Kingdom, neither system is made com-
pulsory by the government, as other governments have, but it
is entirely up to each university to make use of the system
they choose.9 The competition model is still used in most
countries,9 although it is less frequent in the United States.
Still, some universities in the United States use quotas to reg-
ulate the number of tenured track staff,10 and the proportion
of tenured staff has decreased from around 50% in the mid-
1970s11 to 21% in 2010.12 Altbach (2002)13 has pointed out
that ‘‘without question, the most important development is
the diversification of the types of appointment related to
teaching and research. Among the most significant changes
are the increase in the proportion of academic staff without
permanent appointments, even in countries that retain ten-
ure arrangements, and the greater use of part time teach-
ers.’’ In computer science, for example, the number of
postdoc positions has exploded in the last decade, while
the number of available tenure track positions has dra-
matically decreased.14 Brian S. Smith will have applied at
many universities before he would have acquired his first
employment.
Job security is decreasing for academics, as there is much
competition for promotion and often there are a few vacan-
cies, making prospects seem gloomy.15 There are far more
traineeships than there are positions for academics, and, con-
sequently, many researchers are left completely discouraged
or drop out of academia.16 Working under the competition
system, Brian S. Smith would often have to apply to fill va-
cancies in other universities (and perhaps even in other cities
or countries) in order to be promoted. However, academics
with various commitments such as family are less mobile
than others. As a consequence, many academics postpone
their parenthood until their career prospects are estab-
lished.17 In particular, women are often forced to compromise
on their careers for the benefit of their families and children.18
Women in academia have even fewer children compared
with other professional women, primarily because it takes
longer to achieve the job security of tenure.19 In addition, it
is almost impossible for researchers to return to academia
after having been out of the university for a few years.
Since there is such a high emphasis on publishing, returnee
researchers would have little hope of obtaining a position in
competition with ‘true’ academics who have been in acade-
mia ever since they finished their PhD and have developed
a long list of publications.15 Since Brian S. Smith remained
in university, he remained a ‘true’ academic and will have
built up a good publication and teaching record. There are
usually far more competent academics than there are profes-
sorships to fill,9 and the internal competition for these lim-
ited placements can lead to less collaboration between staff
members.9
High levels of competition, lack of time, and lack of fund-
ing are identified in the literature as some of the most stressful
aspects in academia.20 Brian S. Smith will have to write many
funding proposals in order to execute his research and to im-
prove his performance as an academic. At least fourteen (of
the 34) OECD countries use Performance-Based Research
Funding Systems (PBFS). This entails assessing the research
performance of universities and then funding them on the
basis of their performance. In New Zealand, 60% of this as-
sessment is based on ‘‘quality ratings of each individual aca-
demic researcher’’ calculated based on the submission of their
evidence portfolios.5 Brian S. Smith will receive a grade, just
as he did in high school, for his performance as a researcher.
Roberts (2007)5 asserts that these funding systems only in-
crease time pressures, and that the investment of money,
time, and energy into PBFS is counterproductive to a vigor-
ous research environment. The time to be had for reflective
writing is passed over to writing proposals and obtaining
funding,16 and that time is only made worthwhile if it aids
the process of getting funding for research. Brian S. Smith
will have wasted a considerable amount of time on funding
proposals that were eventually rejected. Geard and Noble
(2010)21 argue that this system leads individual researchers
to deplete overall resources, as ‘‘their individually rational ef-
forts to write a convincing proposal that gains them a slice of
the funding pie lead to an equilibrium in which the research
output of the system as a whole goes down’’.21 As each aca-
demic strives to write and assemble the best evidence portfo-
lio, to secure a credible rating and draw more funds to their
institution, any benefits involved are counteracted by the
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enormous cost involved in assigning rankings to academics,
and, consequently, the distribution of funding is rendered in-
efficient. The costs related to choosing grant applications in
the United States and Canada is over and above $100 million
annually.16 Osmond further suggests that the presumed gain
in quality is less than that amount, and that the costs related
to choosing grant applications should be distributed directly
to researchers.
Those who are continually successful at writing successful
funding proposals may have mastered the art, and their suc-
cess is more related to ‘‘slick grantsmanship’’16 than their pro-
posed research addressing the questions that matter most to
society. Most funding proposals these days require extensive
argumentation for the socioeconomic benefits of a project. It is
no longer sufficient to describe a clean research methodology.
It is also necessary to have a sense for what the ‘‘hot topics’’
are. These may change frequently depending on the agenda
of the currently leading political party. Grantsmanship can
even become an alternative to scholarship in the path to pro-
motion.16 Let us assume that Brian S. Smith has mastered all
these challenges and finally secured a permanent position at a
university.
Institutional Reward Structures
Brian S. Smith is now a permanent faculty member and he
is exposed to the reward structures implemented at his uni-
versity. Investigating the views of academic staff from
one Australian university in the late 1980s, Wood (1990)8
reported that research activity was highly variable and influ-
enced by a number of factors, including access to funds and
the promotional reward structure. Although this research
was conducted some time ago and some aspects might
have changed, the findings are still applicable these days.
Benner and Sandstro¨m (2000)22 argue that funding is a key
incentive in the academic system, as its reward structure in-
fluences the performance and evaluation of research. This
provides an incentive for academics to choose research topics
that are more likely to draw outside funding.8 Academics
generally prefer to research those topics that they find most
intellectually challenging, but questions of funding influence
the choices they make.8 When there is fierce competition for
funding and academics adjust their choice of topic accord-
ingly, the autonomy of the individual academic is dimin-
ished, which then becomes counterproductive. Jorge Cham
expressed this absurd condition in his cartoon ‘‘Intellectual
Freedom’’ (see Fig. 1). Brian S. Smith will frequently face
this dilemma, that many of the topics he considers interesting
are unlikely to attract external funding and are, therefore,
pushed back in favor of topics which are of less interest, but
that could potentially receive funding. Brian will spend a con-
siderable amount of time on researching topics that are not
close to his heart. This decreases his passion for his work.
Good research integrates freedom of inquiry. Therefore, it
can be expected that academics researching areas which they
are not interested in would produce a lower standard of
work, as they may lack the enthusiasm, motivation, and com-
mitment a more intellectually stimulating topic would provi-
de.8 More importantly, economic constraints can not only
result in lowering standards of academic work, but they can
even fundamentally corrupt research, as the examples of
Kern and Keller have shown.23 Commercial interest can inhibit
certain studies from being conducted or even motivate aca-
demic misconduct. In an over-competitive environment, the
temptation to give in to such commercial interest is increased.
In a survey on faculty in Management departments, Miller
et al. (2011)24 found that faculty are motivated by the possible
opportunity of ‘‘enhancing their professional reputation,
leaving a permanent mark on their profession, and increasing
their salary and job mobility’’. By the middle of the 1980s, ten-
ure in many universities in the United States and Canada was
determined based on an academic’s publications.25 Publish-
ing ‘‘not only plays a crucial role in determining the fate of
ideas, but also influences the career advancement of individ-
ual scholars’’.26 Successful publishing is crucial for academic
promotion and salary increases; it also has spillover effects
for gaining funding for further research.26 Good publishers
gain a good reputation and are more likely to gain recogni-
tion through promotion.26
In an interview study at an Australian university, Moses
(1986)27 found that many perceive the university as interested
more in publications than in scholarship. He also found that
some adjust their activities accordingly. Brian S. Smith will
emphasize his research over his teaching. The idea of ‘‘getting
FIG. 1. The evolution of
intellectual freedom by Jorge
Cham (with permission from
author).
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the outcomes that are measured’’ is one that is broadly recog-
nized in a range of corporate and institutional environments,
academics also follow the incentives provided by their insti-
tution, recognizing what is valued in their department.
What earns a promotion will be seen as what is valued by
the university, staff will notice the attributes of those being
promoted and strive to emulate the same things.27 Though
some universities have made an effort to increase their em-
phasis on teaching performance in promotion rounds, this
does not seem to have had an effect on the ground. ‘‘What ac-
tually happens on promotions committees is inaccessible data;
what staff believe happens is not.’’27 In the absence of explicit
changes to policy and actual process, those academics who
are seeking promotion still have a strong incentive to focus
on publishing.
Academics responding to such incentives can start relying
on gamesmanship. These academics become devoted to pri-
oritizing research, pursuing publishing goals at the cost of
other responsibilities. Brian S. Smith is no exception to this
tendency. Academic gamesmanship encourages strategy in
producing numerous quick-to-publish articles, also known
as Least Publishable Units (LPU).28 Academics complement
this torrent of publications with a sprinkling of papers of
higher quality that make a contribution to the discipline. Pro-
motional requirements are a significant enticement to employ
gamesmanship in research.8 Heads of departments often dic-
tate who will carry out what academic tasks. Most academics
want to spend the bulk of their time researching, so it is in
their interest to protect the spare time they have as research
time. Academics may use their academic ranking outcomes
as arguments for differentiation of research time. Academics
may also employ negotiation strategies to obtain a buy-out
from teaching and administrative duties.29
In the highly competitive academic environment, it is easy
for academics to gear everything toward publishing. With
‘‘intense intra and inter-institutional competition, production
overrides all else. Production matters more, and indeed
comes to stand in for creativity, critical thought and collegial-
ity. Having a love of learning, a passion for teaching, and a
commitment to intellectual integrity become relevant only in-
sofar as they can be harnessed for the production process’’.5
Brian S. Smith will have to become a writing machine to get
ahead in the publication race. Academics striving for tenure
in universities in the United States and Canada are under
the most pressure to publish, irrespective of the quality. With-
out tenure, academics are less likely to undertake risky or
divisive research.8 An over-competitive environment fa-
vors mainstream ideas, and suppresses novel and opposing
views.30
It is not just publishing that is vital for survival, but pub-
lishing in peer-reviewed journals is more highly recognized
and increasingly, publishing in those journals is considered
a top tier in their field.24 Some departments only value pub-
lishing in a small number of journals without considering oth-
ers, making it very stressful for academics, as top-tier journals
have very low acceptance rates.24,31
Research assessment, evaluation, and rankings on individ-
ual academics is the foundation for research funding alloca-
tion by governments to universities and used by heads of
departments in promotional decisions. Brian S. Smith’s past
performance will have an impact on his ability to secure fu-
ture funding. Adler and Harzing (2009)32 question whether
these measures encourage scholarship or simply encourage
publication. Rankings allegedly measure research quality,
but depending on the system used, quality may be measured
by no more than ‘‘counting publications in high impact-factor
journals along with citations in the limited set of journals that
such systems recognize’’.32 The only research that is included
in ranking systems is measurable research but in the words of
Cameron (1963)33: ‘‘Not everything that can be counted
counts, and not everything that counts can be counted.’’
Brian S. Smith would be wise to focus his attention on tasks
that are being counted by his department. He might check
his and his competitor’s h-index score on Google Scholar fre-
quently to monitor the state of the game.
These crude research measures are now so widely used
that they can determine whether someone is promoted,
whether they are judged a success or a failure.32 The preva-
lent use of ranking systems provides incentives for academics
to focus their productivity toward obtaining favorable assess-
ment results, leading scholarship away from addressing the
questions that matter most in various fields.32 Academic as-
sessment undermines rather than fosters scholarship that
matters.32
Promotion as an incentive increases competitiveness, and a
weighty emphasis on evaluation is likely to have the effect of
encouraging academics to meet the expected requirements for
promotion without striving further.27 This can result in a loss
of efficiency, and once again, researchers are likely to choose
topics based on the ease with which they are published as op-
posed to what stimulates them as researchers.8
In the highly competitive environment of scientifically ad-
vanced countries, the incentive to improve one’s rankings
will always be more motivating than pursuing research
driven by curiosity. Those with finesse in academic games-
manship will generate just the right amount, with all the
right people in exactly the right places. They will learn to
make the system work with efficiency, producing more
and more of what is valued and rewarded by the institution.5
Roberts predicts they will become conformists, valuing
prestige over the quest for knowledge.5 Let us hope that
Brian S. Smith has not become a complete conformist
and that he managed to produce a sufficient number of
good publications.
Assessments and Ranking
Brian S. Smith is now an established academic, and he now
has to face the ranking systems used in academia in decisions
of whom to hire for an academic position to provide a basis
on how to differentiate between candidates.5 However, aca-
demics are not running a simple running race; rather, each ac-
ademic has different goals in their research, which will have
varying levels of difficulty to achieve, each taking varying
lengths of time to achieve them through varying paths.16 Aca-
demics are reasonably incomparable as winners and losers.
Brian S. Smith will have a very different profile than, for ex-
ample, ‘‘Professor Rivera.’’ It will be hard to compare them di-
rectly and with them competing for the same resources, it will
be hard for the decision-making committee to favor one over
the other.
Research assessments and rankings on academics are de-
pendent on an array of arbitrary decisions, including those
‘‘related to choice of publication outlet, choice of time period,
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weighting of data, and aggregation of individuals to an insti-
tutional level’’.32 Adler and Harzing (2009)32 outline key
problems with academic ranking systems; one of the topics
they discuss are the differing parameters around which pub-
lications should be included in a system, noting that some
systems only include articles published in journals, in En-
glish, from top-tier journals, and either internationally pub-
lished or nationally published (not both). This may lead to a
situation in which Brian S. Smith published one of his best ar-
ticles at a conference, and, hence, it was not counted for his
further promotion.
In relation to the weighting of data, Adler and Harzing dis-
cuss decisions on what is valuable, the invisibility of special-
ized journals, and whether or not to allocate extra weight to
the first author of a multi-authored article. Given all of the
combinations of measurability any given system could
have, it seems that any one system would fall short of ade-
quacy for the use in ranking academics, the allocation of re-
search funding, or making promotional decisions.32
Consequences of Rejection
In his academic life, Professor Smith has written many pa-
pers and funding proposals. Not all of them have been ac-
cepted. Given the low acceptance rates of most journals,
almost all academics experience manuscript rejection. Health
Research Council chief executive Robin Olds, the head of one
of the biggest science funding organizations in New Zealand,
said in a recent radio interview that the number of applicants
receiving funding has dwindled in the past decade. The
National Institute of Health (USA) reports that its acceptance
rate has fallen from 31% to 17% in the last 10 years. Using so-
cial identity and rejection sensitivity theories, Day in her land-
mark paper (2011)7 explains why negative emotional
responses to manuscript rejection are normal and predictable.
She exposes how for some scholars, continual rejections may
be ‘‘emotionally difficult and lead to decrements in creativity,
productivity, and professional satisfaction’’. Professor Smith
will frequently have to deal with his motivation being
drained by frequent rejections. Due to the many avenues
for rejection that regularly occur, such as funding proposals,
manuscript rejection, and rankings and promotion, academ-
ics are susceptible to becoming rejection sensitive. To belong
to the academic community, you must publish; when aca-
demics have their manuscripts rejected, those who are rejec-
tion sensitive may feel as though they do not meet the
requirements to be in the academic community.7 Sometimes,
these academics can feel alienated, leading to further feelings
or disillusionment and discouragement.7,34 When experienc-
ing persistent rejection, ‘‘authors may become isolated, ex-
pend too little energy on research, produce little meaningful
work, avoid research projects, and perhaps even ultimately
withdraw from scholarly activities’’.7 Researchers may try
to avoid any interaction or discussion concerning publish-
ing.7 An academic’s social identity is at stake when they
feel as though this membership is threatened.7 To maintain
a sense of belonging to the academic community, researchers
need to have a steady stream of publications.7,31,34
Day (2011)7 describes how the concept of stigma applies to
academics:
‘‘Invisible stigma theory suggests that keeping the stigma
hidden requires that in each relevant social interaction the
rejected scholar make a decision as to whether to reveal the
rejection. To retain secrecy about rejections and others’ per-
ceptions of his or her membership in the social identity, an
underachieving scholar must repeatedly decide whether to
retain secrecy through such means as avoiding conversations
with colleagues concerning research productivity, declining
research collaboration with others, or ‘‘hiding’’ his or her
vita by keeping it off the university’s Web site. The cost of
these repeated disclosure decisions is heightened fear and
anxiety. An academic in this scenario may stop researching
altogether.’’
Junior researchers submitting their first manuscript can get
such a shock that it affects their entire career.34 According to
Day (2011),7 research on how people who are sensitive to re-
jection respond in cases of repetitive rejection sheds light on
the impact of rejection on scholars. First, she suggests that
rejected scholars may dismiss the comments and concerns
of the reviewers to try and disassociate themselves with the
people involved and the review process itself.7 Second, she
notes how rejection often leads to antisocial behavior and,
therefore, may lead to an avoidance of collaborative research
or healthy colleagueship.7 Third, due to the effect of rejec-
tion on self-esteem, scholars will often not talk about their
rejections to their peers in order to save face.7 In addition
to these things, rejection is connected to low academic per-
formance and likely to cause procrastination.7 Since the
experience of rejection causes people to avoid similar circum-
stances, they may postpone research until they are no longer
submitting manuscripts.7 All of these effects are likely to
cause scholars to submit fewer papers for review, if not
drop out altogether. Bedeian (2004)35 also claims that dissat-
isfaction with the publishing game may cause researchers to
discard their manuscript or drop out of the publishing pro-
cess altogether,7,26,34 which means research that was poten-
tially ahead of its time gets lost to the discipline altogether.
These reactions may also apply to promotional rejection,
Moses’ (1986)27 interview study at an Australian university
found six senior lecturers who had applied for promotion
fruitlessly and had ever since given up. We hope that Profes-
sor Smith has not given up doing his research and that he con-
tinues to be a productive academic.
A Drop in Standards
Professor Smith is not the only one affected by the over-
competitive academic environment. The negative effects not
only affect him personally, but they also affect the standards
of the community. The overly competitive environment of
scientifically advanced countries can lead to a drop in re-
search standards. Due to the high competition for research
funding, many academics are heavily restricted by the inade-
quacy of the funding they receive.8 Having funds available to
travel to conduct field work or hire student researchers will
make a significant difference to the scope of a project.8 Hav-
ing student researchers is an important part of academia:
‘‘these students enrich the environment through their enthu-
siasm and new ideas.’’8
Given how highly competitive it is to get a manuscript ac-
cepted, academics are adopting tactics that lower the stan-
dard of their research in various ways. Excessive
competition is a threat to integrity, as researchers are less
likely to follow scientific ideals.23,36 Miller et al. (2011)24
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found that the consequences of the pressure to publish in-
cluded ‘‘heightened stress levels; the marginalization of
teaching; and research that may lack relevance, creativity,
and innovation’’. It is those very consequences of rejection dis-
cussed by Day (2011)7 that lead to the lowering of standards.
Feeling rejected and having less energy can lead academics to
procrastinate, avoiding their work.7 In an interview study by
Moses, staff admitted the temptation to produce below stan-
dard manuscripts so they could produce them at a faster
rate; they also admitted an inclination toward short-term re-
search and to publishing insignificant data.27 This pressure
to publish lowers standards, deterring academics from the op-
portunity to conduct creative and nontraditional research.24
The focus has shifted from making discoveries to the quantity
of papers published and, in some instances, the journals in
which they are published; this distortion directly deteriorates
the quality and utility of the articles. In circumstances where
the pressure is to publish in top-tier journals, academics are
more willing to adjust their manuscripts to fit editor prefer-
ences. This disempowers those academics concerning their
permanent mark on their discipline and decreases the overall
standard of their work.32 ‘‘Burnout, turnover, decreased inno-
vation through risk-aversion, decreased productivity of post-
tenured professors, and abandonment of potentially fruitful
but unappreciated lines of research’’ lower the overall stan-
dard of research in a discipline.7
There may not be a high correlation between the reviewers’
judgments of an article and later citations. Using a statistical
theory of review processes, Starbuck (2005)31 found that
about half of the articles published were not the best submis-
sions to those particular journals, and some of the articles
ranking in the highest 20 had been rejected by as many as
five journals. ‘‘29% to 77% of the articles in the first quintile
of journals [in terms of quality] do not belong in the highest
20% of the manuscripts.’’.31 Many articles that get rejected
are just as good if not better than what get published. Miner
(2003)34 claims that this is because having an acceptance rate
as low as 10% makes it unfeasible to discriminate effectively.
Therefore, there is a considerable level of randomness in edi-
torial selection. ‘‘Highly prestigious journals publish quite a
few low-value articles, low-prestige journals publish some ex-
cellent articles, and excellent manuscripts may receive succes-
sive rejections from several journals’’.31 Some of Professor
Smith’s best workwas rejected several times before its final ac-
ceptance. For that reason, articles cannot be judged principally
based on which journal they are published in. Even Tim Bern-
ers-Lee’s first paper on the World Wide Web was initially
rejected by the Hypertext conference in 1991.
Studies of scientists tend to concentrate on the elite and
successful.37 Even in Miner’s (2003)34 analyses of criticisms
of the review process (with original data from Arthur
Bedeian), all the criticisms were from submissions that
resulted in publication. If there is a significant problem in
the publishing process, as we hear from those still in acade-
mia, what are the feelings of those who have dropped out
completely? After his conclusions, Miner noted the need for
a similar study while receiving feedback from those academ-
ics whose manuscripts were rejected.34
The system is self-perpetuating. Brian S. Smith sits in his of-
fice; he sends funding proposals to compete for outside fund-
ing, manuscript submissions to compete for published
articles, evidence portfolios to compete for his academic rank-
ing, and applications to deans to compete for promotion.
Each of these submissions has a high chance of rejection.
For the small percentage of those who are not rejected, the
funding they receive improves their chance at being pub-
lished, which will improve their academic ranking and chan-
ces for promotion. For those who manage to get published in
a top-tier journal, this will also improve their academic rank-
ing and chances for promotion. For those who receive a de-
cent ranking, promotion is more likely. Those who get
promoted will receive a better ranking next time and better
opportunities overall. On the other hand, if the academic is
not receiving funding, manuscript acceptance, quality rank-
ings, and promotions, they are receiving rejections. Rejection
leads to doubt in their abilities, which leads to procrastination
and lack of productivity.7 In a field or discipline, certain ways
of doing things are routinized, accepted, and sustained by the
discipline’s members. The cycle continues; not only does the
system perpetuate opportunities (or failure) for academics
within the system, but also procedures become standardized
and the existing competitive structure of university research
is continually reproduced.22 ‘‘Funding agencies contribute
to constructing, reproducing, and changing the institutional
order of academic research.. Thus, research sponsors influ-
ence the framework for research performance and the net-
works which form part of the research environment’’.22
Funding applications are accepted based on criteria, and re-
search is produced within those same criteria, facilitating
the reproduction of the organization.22 If an institution
makes it into, for example, a top 50 ranking, pressure and ex-
pectations will be put on academics within the institution to
maintain and improve their position.24 Junior researchers
coming into academic institutions will pick up on what is val-
ued and prioritize their own research agendas accordingly.27
One of the traditional roles of research has been to question
prevailing views,5 yet there are compelling incentives in the
current university system to conform. There is, therefore, a
smaller amount of research that tests existing practices to
see whether it is accomplishing what is proposed.34
Conclusion
This study focused on the negative effects of highly com-
petitive systems. A recent study of staff dissatisfaction levels
in tertiary institutions in Victoria (Australia) found that,
along with the dissatisfaction generated from management
practices directly impacting the respondent, a ‘‘general dis-
content with neo-liberal change across the economic and
social spheres’’38 was also a contributor to work dissatisfac-
tion among academics. The incorporation of an over-compet-
itive environment into academia is a clear outcome of this
neoliberal change. Green (2006)39 argues that the two main
drivers of work dissatisfaction under neo-liberalism are
workloads and the perceived loss of control. There is a gen-
eral feeling that market-based reforms have not delivered
freedom and flexibility, but further managerialism and
control.
By summarizing this dark side of academia, we hope to
stimulate a discussion on how we conduct our academic
lives. The integrity and values of institutional research faces
many threats. The particular concern discussed in this article
was the effect of the over-competitiveness in funding, pub-
lishing, and promotion. Combined with the increasing use
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of academic rankings to evaluate academics, this environ-
ment reinforces reward systems that work as incentives for
academics to produce measurable results. Competition is en-
couraged in order to increase efficiency. However, when the
level of competition is such that many academics have to
deal with persistent rejection, the negative spillover effect is
a dropping of standards, and survival by publishing becomes
more important than the pursuit of knowledge.
Besides the negative psychological effects that over-
competitiveness brings about, it can even be argued that
the current competitive funding distribution process is inef-
ficient. Of course, the peer review process will at least filter
out the worst proposals and it is likely to favor ‘better’ pro-
posals. These proposals are likely to result in more and bet-
ter research output. The peer review process certainly has a
certain success as a filter. However, the effort necessary to
run the process and its negative side effects described in
this article seem to outweigh this advantage. We speculate
that a research funding lottery might be at least as successful
as the current system.
Despite the extremely low acceptance rates, for example
7.7% for the 2012 Marsden funding in New Zealand, hun-
dreds of researchers surprisingly still submit their proposals.
Let us assume that it might have taken Brian S. Smith a week
to write such a proposal at an hourly rate of $200. This would
result in an investment of $8,000. If we offer Professor Smith a
choice—that he could either keep the $8,000 or that he can bet
it on one number in roulette with the chance of winning
$280,000—he would probably choose not to play. However,
the pressure on academics is so high that we overestimate
our success chances and keep on writing proposals. While
the available research funding remains stable, we dramati-
cally increase the number of proposals, which increasingly
renders the system inefficient. Moreover, the hours Professor
Smith invests in the proposal and the time of the reviewers to
judge the proposal does not appear in any ‘‘official’’ record-
keeping, and, hence, the organizers of the funding distribu-
tion process can maintain the illusion that their process is
efficient.
It was also interesting to observe how few studies have
been published on the negative effects of competition in aca-
demia. We talked about the papers of Nancy Day and Peter
Roberts at length, partly because, to our knowledge, there
are not many studies that investigated these negative side ef-
fects. What prevents us from opening our eyes to the absur-
dity of the academic situation? Why are we so convinced
that our proposal will be accepted? Why do we believe that
we will achieve a tenured process and that our paper will
be accepted by Nature? Coming back to Alice’s question
‘‘Who won the race?’’ we conclude that currently we are all
losing.
Limitations and Future Work
This study focuses on a review of relevant literature on the
negative effects of over-competitiveness. We are not able to
offer a solution for the problem of how to allocate limited re-
search funds, although we previously offered some ideas on
how to improve the publication process.40 Unfortunately,
we can not just ‘‘try out’’ different allocation processes and
compare them with others. Changing a research funding pro-
cess so fundamentally and comparing its results with other
processes is impractical, as it would take years to observe
the impact that any individual funded project had.
We are, therefore, currently in the process of developing a
computer simulation that tests the efficiency of different
funding allocation processes. Until this simulation is ready,
we do not have any suggestions other than our personal opin-
ions, and those solutions already suggested in the literature.
One possible alternative to distributing funding would be a
simple lottery. It would cut the overhead dramatically
while still being able to give larger chunks of money to re-
searchers. An alternative to over-competitiveness in the pub-
lications would be to adopt an ‘‘All in publication policy’’ as
described in.40 These processes and policies would disrupt
the process of ‘‘normal’’ science, as they fundamentally
change the incentives for researchers and the spirit in which
resources are distributed. We would finally acknowledge
that science is largely unpredictable. Knowing up front
what scientific discoveries will have, a lasting positive impact
is difficult, if not impossible.
In 1918, Albert Einstein famously said that ‘‘In the temple of
science are many mansions, and various indeed are they that
dwell therein and the motives that have led them thither.
Many take to science out of a joyful sense of superior intellec-
tual power; science is their own special sport to which they
look for vivid experience and the satisfaction of ambition;
many others are to be found in the temple who have offered
the products of their brains on this altar for purely utilitarian
purposes. Were an angel of the Lord to come and drive all
the people belonging to these two categories out of the temple,
the assemblage would be seriously depleted, but there would
still be somemen, of both present and past times, left inside..
If the types we have just expelled were the only types there
were, the temple would never have come to be, any more
than a forest can growwhich consists of nothing but creepers.’’
Being interested in science should be for no other purpose than
science is and will always be the heart of science. What we still
observe is the battle between the intellectual and societal levels
of quality.41 The superiority of the intellectual quality level is
still being challenged by societal needs.
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